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This study was designed to experimentally test the impact of the specificity of one’s 
autobiographical memories on affect, and to examine how memory specificity may differentially 
impact emotional responses across development. In the literature on memory specificity, the 
Affect Regulation hypothesis (Williams, 1996; Williams et al., 2007) argues that recalling 
autobiographical memories in an overgeneral manner serves to decrease emotional distress 
through avoidance of the painful specific details of one’s past. While there is evidence for 
connections between naturally-occurring variations in memory specificity and emotion-
regulation in adults, the relationship between memory recall style and distress has not been 
directly tested in an experimental manner, and no studies have examined such processes in child 
samples. In this study, 93 children, adolescents, and young adults (8 – 28 years) were randomly 
assigned to recall negative memories in the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) in either a 
general or a specific manner. To control for the differential retrieval effort involved in the two 
remembering conditions, the memories were generated and audio-recorded during Session 1 and 
played back for the participants one to two weeks later, during Session 2. Pre- and post-tests of 
emotional states at this second session were used to evaluate the impact of memory recall 
condition on participants’ affect. Analyses indicated that general recall was related to improved 
emotional state relative to specific recall. Further, individual differences in executive function 
and emotion regulation abilities contributed to these associations; for instance, individuals who 
were high in suppressive tendencies were more negatively impacted by the specific condition 
than those who were lower in suppression. Implications for models of autobiographical memory 
and emotion regulation, as well as interventions aimed at hoping children and young adults cope 
with negative experiences, are discussed.   
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Reacting to the Past: A Developmental Examination of the Emotion Regulation 
Role of Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
Autobiographical memories, or memories for personally experienced events, are 
dynamically constructed mental representations (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Schacter, 1996). As argued by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) and others, the 
construction, and reconstruction, of one’s autobiographical memories is regulated by control 
processes which seek to maintain consistency between one’s view of themselves, their goals, 
their emotional state, and the event itself (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Wegner, 1994). In 
fact, it has been proposed that autobiographical memories serve as a “resource” for the 
maintenance or alteration of the individual’s emotional state (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Gross, 2001; Robinson, 1986). For instance, individuals may emphasize past victories in their 
memories to increase their current positive emotion, ruminate on past problems or challenges 
(Wong & Watt, 1991), or selectively retrieve positive (rather than negative) memories or aspects 
of memories to strategically increase positive affect (Gross, 1998). Additionally, one may further 
attempt to moderate his/her emotional reactions to the remembered experiences by drawing on 
emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal and suppression, to help them reframe 
the event in a more positive light while avoiding aversive aspects of the experience (Gross, 1998; 
Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). Therefore, it appears that the qualities of one’s autobiographical 
memories play a critical role in the maintenance of the psychological and emotional status of an 
individual.  
One quality of autobiographical memory that has received substantial attention in the 
literature over the past twenty-five years, due to its connection to psychological health and 
wellbeing, is autobiographical memory specificity. A large body of work finds that individuals 
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with a history of trauma and/or trauma-related psychopathology demonstrate lower levels of 
memory specificity than individuals without such histories (e.g., Henderson, Hargreaves, 
Gregory, & Williams, 2002; McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; Williams & Dritschel, 
1988). Consistent with the argument that individuals regulate their emotional states at least in 
part through their approaches to autobiographical remembering, it has been proposed that 
reduced levels of memory specificity in traumatized populations are reflective of individuals’ 
attempts to control or reduce the negative feelings associated with these aversive past 
experiences (the Affect Regulation Hypothesis; Williams, 1996; Williams et al., 2007). In 
particular, this position argues that recalling past negative experiences in a general manner 
allows individuals to avoid the potentially distressing specifics of the event. However, there have 
been no experimental tests of the impact of memory specificity on emotional responses, and it is 
currently unknown whether children and adults are equally able to regulate their emotions 
through their memory recall style. Given developmental differences in the types and 
effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies that are employed by children and adults (e.g., 
Kalpidou, Power, Cherry, & Gottfried, 2004; Stansbury & Sigman, 2000; Stegge & Meerum 
Terwogt, 2007), we might expect differences in younger and older individuals’ ability to benefit 
from the use of memory specificity as an emotional coping mechanism.  
This study was designed to address these unanswered questions about memory specificity 
and emotional responses. Specifically, this investigation directly tests whether the nature of one’s 
memory for negative experiences impacts one’s emotional state, and whether this relationship 
changes across development. Further, this study also examined whether individual and age-
related differences in coping and emotion regulation strategies influenced the relationship 
between memory specificity and emotion.  
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Memory Specificity and Emotional States 
Autobiographical memory specificity first received attention in the memory literature 
after a number of investigations found that individuals under psychological stress (i.e., depressed 
adults or individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder) had difficulty recollecting specific past 
experiences (e.g., McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; Williams & Dritschel, 1988). 
When asked to recall specific past events in response to cue words, these individuals tended to 
provide categorical or generic descriptions of past experiences, particularly when prompted with 
positively-valenced cue words. Shortly after these initial demonstrations, it was also found that 
this tendency toward “overgeneral” memories was also characteristic of adults with histories of 
childhood trauma (e.g., Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory, & Williams, 2002; Hermans, Van den 
Broeck, Bells, Raes, Pieters, & Eelen, 2004). Since these early investigations, there has been a 
plethora of research supporting the link between trauma, or trauma-related psychopathology, and 
the overgeneral memory phenomenon (Dalgleish et al., 2007).  
The majority of the work on overgeneral memory and trauma has employed the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). In this commonly used task of 
autobiographical memory specificity, participants are presented with a number of positive, 
negative, and neutral cue words and are instructed to provide a specific autobiographical memory 
(i.e., a one-time personal event) related to each cue. Participants are usually given 30 or 60 
seconds in which to recall each memory, and each memory is coded as specific, overgeneral, or 
not a memory. A response is coded as “specific” when it refers to a one-time, autobiographical 
event that lasted less than 24 hours (e.g., “I went to the zoo for my twelfth birthday and saw a 
baby gorilla.”). An “overgeneral” code is given to a memory that is autobiographical in nature 
but refers to an event that lasted longer than 24 hours or refers to a category of events (e.g., “My 
4 
parents always let me go to the zoo on my birthday.”). Finally, a response is coded as “not a 
memory” if it is not autobiographical in nature or is not a memory (e.g., “I like zoos.”). 
There are a number of hypotheses regarding the mechanisms responsible for overgeneral 
memory production in individuals with traumatic past experiences. One hypothesis draws on the 
observation that chronic stress is related to a dyregulation in cortisol production, and prolonged 
exposure to atypical levels of cortisol can result in the atrophy of hippocampal neurons (e.g., 
Sapolsky, 1996; Sapolsky, Krey, & McEwen, 1986). As the hippocampus is implicated in 
episodic memory consolidation and retrieval, this hypothesis would suggest that chronic stress 
would impair the construction and generation of rich episodic memories (e.g., Bremner, 2005; 
Nelson & Carver, 1998, Sapolsky, 1996). An alternate suggestion argues that impaired memory 
specificity reflects processing resource limitations, attributable to intrusive thoughts about past 
negative experiences and efforts aimed at avoiding said thoughts. However, both of these 
hypotheses would predict general impairments to the memory system, rather than the observed 
deficits that appear to be specific to autobiographical memory. In fact, studies that have 
accounted for working memory or general episodic memory abilities find that these factors fail to 
account for the relationships between trauma history or psychopathology and overgeneral 
memory (de Decker, Hermans, Raes, & Eelen, 2003; Wessel, Merckelbach, & Dekkers, 2002).   
Instead, the most widely accepted explanation for the connections between poor 
autobiographical memory specificity and traumatic experiences and trauma-related 
psychopathology is the Affect Regulation Hypothesis (Williams, 1996; Williams et al., 2007). 
This model proposes that individuals with negative past experiences tend to recall overgeneral, 
as opposed to specific, memories of autobiographical experiences to avoid the negative affect 
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associated with their past experiences. In this way, Williams and colleagues argue, overgeneral 
memory recall may serve as a means of avoidant coping.  
The hypothesis put forward by Williams for the development of overgeneral memory 
draws heavily on a model of autobiographical memory proposed by Conway and his colleagues. 
According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model, our memories of personally-relevant 
experiences are organized in a hierarchical fashion, starting at the most broad category of 
lifetime periods (e.g., “when I was in college”), to general events (e.g., “attending football games 
in college”), and finally event-specific knowledge (“attending my first college football game 
with my roommate”). There are two ways in which individuals may search this hierarchical 
network in order to retrieve a memory: direct retrieval and generative retrieval (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Direct retrieval is a bottom-up, spontaneous 
recall process in which event cues automatically prompt the recall of event-specific knowledge. 
In contrast, generative retrieval is a top-down process that consists of an effortful, intentional 
search of memory. An intentional memory search may begin one of two ways: 1) at the level of 
the lifetime period, in which case the information from the lifetime period is then used to 
generate categorical information about the to-be-remembered event, or 2) at the level of the 
categorical information. Regardless of the entry point for the intentional search, the generation of 
a specific memory involves another step in the recall process, where individuals must use the 
categorical information to aid their retrieval of event-specific information. However, the Affect 
Regulation Hypothesis argues that if retrieval of event-specific information begins to activate 
aversive details, individuals may truncate their intentional memory search at the general events 
category, resulting in the retrieval of an overgeneral, rather than specific, event (Williams, 1996).  
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The Affect Regulation Hypothesis predicts that engaging in the repeated truncation of the 
memory search process, in order to avoid the negative affect associated with specific past events, 
should result in the eventual development of an overgeneral memory style. This hypothesis 
argues that if individuals are reaping an emotional benefit from avoiding event-specific 
knowledge, this benefit may serve as negative reinforcement for truncating retrieval, resulting in 
a dysfacilitation of the memory retrieval process and increasing the likelihood of truncated 
memory searches in the future. Further, Williams and colleagues (2007) suggest that when 
multiple truncated searches occur, the resulting network of intermediate descriptions becomes 
elaborated and reinforced. The next time an individual attempts to retrieve a related memory, 
they are increasingly more likely to activate other intermediate descriptions instead of a specific 
episodic memory, a phenomenon labeled as “mnemonic interlock.” In mnemonic interlock, the 
memory search process occurs in a lateral direction in the hierarchy rather than downwards 
(Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer, Kleinpaß, & Nikesch, 2002). Therefore, the avoiding of negative 
details in one instance, through the activation of overgeneral memories, may increase the future 
likelihood of recalling events in the same manner, perhaps developing into a style over time 
(Williams et al., 2007). Also, given that generative retrieval of specific memories is more 
effortful than retrieval of generic memories, reduced cognitive abilities, such as executive 
function abilities, may exacerbate the development of an overgeneral recall style (e.g., Dalgleish 
et al., 2007).  
Although overgeneral recall may be protective in the short term, the Williams model 
suggests that this approach to recall is associated with increased vulnerability to depression (e.g., 
Burnside, Startup, Byatt, Rollinson, & Hill, 2004; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere, 
Sabbe, Pieters, et al., 2006; van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005), as well as 
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increased likelihood of posttraumatic stress disorder (e.g., Dalgleish, Rolfe, Golden, Dunn, & 
Barnard, 2008; McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995). Further, clinical examinations of 
overgenerality and psychopathology suggest that the link between overgeneral memory and 
depression may be mediated by ruminative tendencies (Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 2009; Raes, 
Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008).  
Williams and colleagues (1996) argue that, as overgeneral recall is a fairly stable trait that 
is not accounted for by mood congruency effects (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 
1993; Mackinger, Pachinger, & Leibsertseder, 2000), overgeneral memory style is proposed to 
develop and become more stable over time. Therefore, children with highly aversive 
experiences, such as abuse or other traumas, may be one population that would be particularly 
likely to adopt an overgeneral recall style, in order to avoid the complex negative emotions 
associated with these past experiences. Younger individuals may be more likely to develop an 
overgeneral style because in their daily recollecting, they are less likely to retrieve specific 
memories in the first place (e.g., Drummond, Dritschel, Astell, O'Carroll, & Dalgleish, 2006). 
Coupling this tendency with a highly aversive and emotion-laden experience may lead to 
children’s adoption of an overgeneral approach to recollecting as a coping strategy. 
There is some existing indirect evidence for the Affect Regulation hypothesis, as 
previous work has found relationships between overgeneral recall and avoidance. For example, 
there is a significant positive correlation between avoidance, as measured on the Impact of 
Events Scale, and overgeneral memory production (e.g., Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Wessel, 
Merckelbach, & Dekkers, 2002). Additionally, Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, and Eelen 
(2005) found that less specific individuals reported higher levels of behavioral avoidance and 
thought suppression than more specific individuals. The model is also supported by research 
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showing that negative mood inductions can increase the likelihood of overgeneral recall. 
McBride and Cappeliez (2004) assigned non-depressed college-aged participants to one of three 
mood induction conditions (elated, neutral, or depressed) before administering the AMT. The 
authors found that individuals in the depressed mood induction group produced more categoric 
memories than those in the elation induction group, although the comparison between the 
depressed group and the neutral group was not significant. This work is consistent with the view 
that negative affect may prompt avoidant recall patterns in the form of overgenerality. 
Thus, the extant literature indicates that avoidant coping is related to overgeneral memory 
production and that negative moods induce greater overgeneral memory production, presumably 
as a strategy to regulate the negative affect. However, the evidence for whether overgeneral 
memory is actually effective in reducing negative affect is more tenuous and does not allow for 
causal inferences. For instance, a study by Hermans et al. (2008) attempted to tackle this issue; in 
this study, students who had unexpectedly performed poorly on an exam two weeks prior were 
recruited to complete the AMT and self-report measures of psychological stress. Seven weeks 
later, participants were again asked to provide self-reports of the stress associated with 
notification of their poor exam performance. This work found that individuals who reported 
fewer specific memories on the AMT at Week 2 reported less psychological stress related to the 
exam at Week 9, suggesting that the overgeneral memory style may have reduced negative 
affect.  
Similarly, Raes et al. (2003) used a baseline assessment of memory specificity in healthy 
adults to identify two groups, one containing individuals who were highly specific on the AMT, 
and another group of people who provided very few specific memories (Raes, Hermans, de 
Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 2003). Individuals in these two groups were then asked to return to 
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the lab, where they participated in an easy and a frustrating task. This work found that the high-
specific individuals reported greater subjective distress immediately following the frustrating 
task than individuals who were in the low-specific group, while there were no differences in 
distress levels between the high- and low-specific groups in response to the completion of the 
easy task.  
The findings of Hermans et al. (2008) and Raes et al. (2003) are consistent with the 
hypothesis that negative appraisals increase avoidant tendencies. However, due to the fact that 
these analyses did not manipulate the nature of memory specificity, the precise role of recall 
style in reducing negative affect is not clear, as these patterns could be explained by the 
operation of other variables that may differ with memory specificity performance, such as 
cognitive control processes and emotion regulation abilities. Therefore, this study was designed 
to provide a strong test of how the specificity of memories for negative events impacts emotional 
state.  
To address this goal in the current investigation, the specificity of memory recall was 
experimentally manipulated across participants, such that half of the participants were assigned 
to recall specific events while the other half were assigned to recall general categories of events. 
Additionally, the experiment was conducted over two sessions in order to account for potential 
differences in the effort required to recall specific memories versus general memories. The 
retrieval of specific information has been found to be more cognitively effortful than the retrieval 
of categorical events (Haque & Conway, 2001). As increased cognitive effort is related to 
increases in negative affect (e.g., Garbarino & Edell, 1997), potential differences in negative 
affect following memory generation could be attributable to the differential effort required of the 
two retrieval conditions. In order to control for these differences in cognitive effort, participants 
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recalled their memories during the first session, and they listened to and rated their emotional 
responses to these memories during the second session.  
The Role of Emotion Regulation Abilities and Executive Function 
Although the Affect Regulation Hypothesis predicts that specific and general recall 
should produce different levels of emotional responses, the manner in which individuals cope 
with the elicited emotions in their specific or general memories should also be expected to 
contribute to their emotional reactions to different types of memories. And in fact, there is a large 
literature on the ways in which individuals may engage in emotion regulation to modify their 
responses to emotional information. Emotion regulation consists of intrinsic and extrinsic 
attempts to modify one’s level and type of emotional response (Calkins, 1994; Gross, 2001; 
Thompson, 1994) and as such, individuals’ emotion regulation abilities are expected to 
contribute to emotional responses to negative memories. The literature suggests that emotion 
regulation can be automatic or effortful (Cole et al., 1994; Gross & Thompson, 2007), and 
involves not only the reduction of emotional intensity but also the production and maintenance of 
appropriate emotional responses (Cole et al., 1994; Calkins & Hill, 2007).  
Two common approaches to emotion regulation are reappraisal and suppression, which, 
according to Gross and John (2003), operate at different time points during the coping process. 
Reappraisal is described as an “antecedent-focused strategy,” meaning that it operates early in 
the retrieval process, before the memory trace and its associated emotional response are fully 
generated. Conversely, suppression is described as a “response-focused strategy,” meaning that 
this strategy is employed late in the retrieval process. Rather than modifying one’s view of an 
event, suppression alters the expression of the emotions that are generated. Therefore, in the 
context of memory retrieval, reappraisal should be related to the content of the memory that is 
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retrieved, while suppression should be related to individuals’ emotional responses to that 
memory content. 
The ability to respond appropriately to and regulate one’s response to the emotional 
content in negative memories may further rely on the skills of modifying one’s memory by 
focusing one’s attention on the positive features of the memory while inhibiting negative 
emotional responses. As examined in a seminal study by Miyake and colleagues (2000), the 
cognitive abilities of memory updating, attentional shifting, and inhibition are interrelated 
components of what is jointly described as executive function. These executive function abilities 
initiate and stop behavior, monitor and change actions, and plan future behavior. In the context 
of autobiographical memory retrieval, executive function abilities are the control processes that 
plan and enact the selection of particular memories (or aspects of a memory), inhibit the retrieval 
of highly emotional responses to these memories, and conduct the constant modifications and 
maintenance of the memory in order to sustain a more positive emotional state and view of the 
event (e.g., Band & Weisz, 1988; Miller & Green, 1985; Thompson, 1994). 
Therefore, another goal of the current investigation was to examine how measures of 
executive function and emotion regulation abilities were related to participants’ responses in the 
two memory conditions.  It was expected that both emotion regulation and executive function 
abilities would be positively related to emotional responses to the retrieval of negative memories. 
If specific recall does indeed generate a greater level of negative affect than general recall, 
specific memories should require that individuals recruit a greater amount of emotion regulation 
and executive function resources in order to regulate the associated emotional content of 
negative experiences. As such, in our study, we expected that emotion regulation abilities and 
12 
executive function should be positively related to decreased negative affect and increased 
positive affect over time, particularly in the specific condition.  
Developmental Differences in Responses to Memory Specificity 
Another major goal of this investigation was to look at whether emotional responses to 
specific and general negative memories vary across childhood and adolescence. The 
developmental literature provides several reasons to predict age differences in these 
relationships. First and foremost, the ability to engage in the adaptive regulation of emotion 
appears to change dramatically across childhood (e.g., Calkins, 1994; Cicchetti, Ganiban, & 
Barnett, 1991; Kopp, 1989; Thompson, 1994), and these changing abilities have implications for 
children’s capability to cope with memories of negative past experiences. While most of the 
literature that has examined the development of emotion regulation abilities has focused on 
infancy and early childhood (e.g., Eisenberg, Champion, & Ma, 2004; Thompson, 1994), 
additional work finds that emotion regulation abilities continue to develop and become more 
sophisticated across childhood and adolescence (Beauregard, Levesque, & Paquette, 2004; 
Calkins, Gill, Johnson, & Smith, 1999; Calkins & Johnson, 1998; Kopp, 1989). Indeed, this 
work suggests that the ability to employ emotion regulation strategies such as avoiding 
emotional expression (i.e., suppression) and re-evaluating negative events in a more positive 
light (i.e., reappraisal) continues to develop across adolescence. Further, there is also evidence 
that not only does the use of emotion regulation strategies increase with age, but the use of said 
strategies also becomes more effective (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1992; Neshat-
Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1998). For instance, in a five-year longitudinal study 
of cognitive styles and depression in children from the age of 8 to 13, Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, 
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and Seligman (1992) found that as age increased, so did the relationship between children’s 
coping abilities and their concurrent levels of psychological wellbeing.  
These developmental differences in emotion regulation and coping may be due, at least in 
part, to developmental improvements across childhood in gross motor and basic cognitive 
abilities; these basic developmental building blocks are related to improvements in the ability to 
regulate one’s own behavior, interpret the behaviors and emotions of others, and use information 
from one’s social context to respond appropriately (e.g., Kopp, 1982; 1989). Developmental 
differences in emotion regulation may also come about due to differences in children’s ability to 
understand and recognize complex emotions such as fear and anger in themselves and others 
(Gagnon, Gosselin, Hudon-ven der Buhs, Larocque, & Milliard, 2010; Gosselin & Larocque, 
2000; Vicari et al., 2000); if children are not able to identify emotions appropriately or 
understand their sources, then they may be limited in their ability to regulate their reactions to 
this emotional content. Further, the development of emotion regulation abilities appears to hinge 
on the scaffolding of appropriate responses by parents and caregivers (e.g., Calkins, 1994). 
Indeed, socio-cultural models of memory development (Fivush, 1991; Fivush & Fromhoff, 1988; 
Fivush & Nelson, 2006; Vygotsky, 1978) suggest that children depend on adults to help them 
cope with and find meaning from negative past events – a task that may be too cognitively taxing 
for children to perform on their own (e.g., Fivush, et al., 2007; Rogosch, Cicchetti, & Toth, 
2004). Thus, both internal and external factors appear to influence to gradual development of 
effective emotion regulation strategies across childhood and adolescence. 
Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, the ability to effectively regulate one’s 
emotions in response to negative experiences appears to rely on the complex coordination of a 
suite of cognitive skills, which also improve with age. It has been suggested that the ability to 
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respond appropriately to the emotional content in memory may rely on the skills of modifying 
one’s memory by focusing one’s attention on the positive features of the memory while 
inhibiting negative emotional responses (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000; Band & Weisz, 1988; Miller 
& Green, 1985; Thompson, 1994). The developmental literature on executive function indicates 
that, parallel to the developmental trajectory of emotion regulation skills, executive function 
abilities also increase gradually over childhood and adolescence (Anderson, Anderson, & Lajoie, 
1996; Baker, Segalowitz, & Ferlisi, 2001; Best & Miller, 2010; Huizinga, Dolan, & van der 
Molen, 2006; Lehto, 2004), although there is variability in terms of when adult-like performance 
is demonstrated between the three executive function abilities.  
In regard to working memory, there appears to be linear increases in working memory 
abilities throughout childhood and into adolescence (e.g., Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & 
Wearing, 2004; Luciana & Nelson, 2005). For instance, Luciana and Nelson (2005) reported 
consistent age-related improvements on a variety of non-verbal working memory tasks between 
the ages of 4 and 20 years. In terms of shifting, it appears that the ability to shift your attention 
between options reaches adult-like levels by about age 15 (Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de 
Sather, 2001; Davidson et al., 2006; Huizinga et al, 2006; Kray, Eber, & Lindenberger, 2004). 
Further, Davidson and colleagues (2006) found that as age increased, reaction time decreased 
while accuracy increased, suggesting that older participants are more likely to engage in the 
meta-cognitive monitoring of their responses during shifting (Best & Miller, 2010). Finally, in 
terms of inhibition, the literature on the developmental patterns in this domain are mixed. Some 
work finds that inhibition improves dramatically across early childhood, between the ages of 
about 5 to 8 years (Romine & Reynolds, 2005), and these improvements are particularly 
observed on tasks that require both working memory and inhibition (Carlson, 2005; Gerstadt et 
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al., 1994). However, other work finds that inhibition skills continue to improve into adolecence 
(Bedard et al., 2002; Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti Nuuttila, 2001; Ridderinkhof & Van der 
Molen, 1995); the most consistent work that evidences later inhibition improvements relies on 
the use of computerized tasks and the analysis of reaction time (see Best & Miller, 2010, for a 
review).  
Therefore, the general pattern of executive function abilities appears to indicate age-
related improvements in memory updating, shifting, and inhibition skills through childhood and 
in some cases, into adolescence. If these cognitive skills are related to one’s ability to apply and 
benefit from the application of emotion regulation strategies, then developmental increases in 
emotion regulation would be expected to, at least in part, be explained by changes in executive 
function abilities across childhood and adolescence. In fact, there is some evidence that links 
executive function abilities with the effectiveness of emotion regulation across development. For 
instance, Cummings (1987) reports that 4-5 year olds who engaged in greater attentional 
inhibition were more able to regulate their emotions while witnesses an argument between two 
adults. Further, in a study of older children and early adolescents in boarding school, children 
who shifting their attention to think about the positive components of being away are boarding 
school were found to have lower reports of homesickness (Harris & Lipian, 1989). Therefore, as 
argued by Thompson (1994), behavioral and cognitive emotion regulation strategies appear to 
draw heavily on basic cognitive abilities such as memory updating, shifting, and inhibition.  
In the current investigation, it was expected that children would demonstrate more 
negative reactions to listening to their memories than would adults, particularly if they were 
assigned to the Specific condition. One of the reasons that age-related differences were expected 
is the gradual development of executive function and emotion regulation abilities across 
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childhood and adolescence, abilities which contribute to one’s ability to cope with emotion in 
memory. Both emotion regulation and executive function skills were expected to positively 
relate to affect regulation, but these skills were predicted to be more strongly implicated in the 
reacting to specific memories than to general memories, due to the assumption that specific 
memories generate a greater amount of negative affect relative to general memories.  
Aims of this Research 
 This study was designed to extend earlier research on overgeneral memory and emotion 
by examining whether an experimental manipulation of memory specificity influenced 
participants’ levels of positive and negative affect. Specifically, we used an experimental 
paradigm to investigate whether individuals assigned to a specific recall condition experienced 
more negative (and fewer positive) emotional reactions than individuals assigned to a general 
recall condition, and whether these effects varied with age. Further, this study examined how 
age-related and individual differences in cognitive abilities and coping strategies contributed to 
the influence of memory specificity on affect.  
To address these aims, children, adolescents and young adults were asked to generate 
specific or general memories and an experimental procedure was used to examine their 
emotional responses to their memories. During Session 1, participants completed the 
Autobiographical Memory Task, in which they first completed a baseline test of specificity 
before being randomly assigned to recall negative memories in either a specific or general 
fashion. The baseline test of specificity was conducted to examine whether differences in 
tendencies toward recalling in a specific or general fashion influenced the impact of the assigned 
recall style on affect. While the traditional AMT employs positive, negative, and neutral cue 
words, all of the cue words that were used in this study, both during the baseline and the 
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experimental sessions, were negatively-valenced, as we were particularly interested in how 
memory specificity may relate to one’s ability to regulate their emotions in response to negative 
memories. During Session 2, participants completed ratings of their emotional states before and 
after listening to the memories that they provided in Session 1. Participants also completed a 
measure of executive function ability, as well as assessments of depressive symptoms, 
reappraisal strategies, suppression strategies, and rumination. Measures of depressive symptoms 
and ruminative strategies were included as control variables, as indirect indices of maladaptive 
emotional coping or regulation.  
Specific Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Memory exposure in the Specific condition was expected to increase 
negative affect and decrease positive affect relative to baseline levels, while affect was expected 
to remain more stable in the General condition. 
Hypothesis 2: The influences of memory specificity on affect were expected to be 
stronger for younger children than for older adolescents and young adults.  
Hypothesis 3: Higher self-reported use of the emotion regulation strategies of reappraisal 
and suppression was hypothesized to relate to more positive emotional states (reduced negative 
affect and increased positive affect). In this context, as overgeneral memory is hypothesized to 
serve as an avoidant mechanism, the impact of suppression on decreasing negative affect may be 
stronger than the impact of reappraisal on affect. It was also possible that the contribution of 
emotion regulation and executive function abilities would interact with condition, such that 
Specific recall would draw more heavily on these abilities than would General recall. 
Hypothesis 4: Any observed age-related differences in the impact of memory specificity 
on affect were expected to be at least partially explained by executive function and/or emotion 
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regulation abilities. In particular, higher levels of executive function abilities, and a greater use 
of emotion regulation strategies, were expected to be related to less negative affect and greater 
positive affect relative to baseline.  
METHOD 
Participants.  
A total of 93 participants participated in this research, 32 males and 61 females. The 
younger participants (age 8 – 17 years; Mage = 11.95 years, SD = 2.06 years) were recruited from 
surrounding Kansas City schools, and the college-aged participants (age 18-28 years; Mage = 
19.24 years, SD = 1.87 years) were recruited from the university’s introductory psychology 
research pool. The younger participants received $10 gift certificates for participation in each of 
the two sessions, and the college-aged participants received research credits for each session. All 
participants used English as their primary language and were typically developing.  
A power analysis was conducted to determine the required sample size for this study. The 
reference data were drawn from Yim et al. (2010), a study which reports changes in mood on the 
PANAS and PANAS-C in response to a negative task in a sample of 9-12 year olds and a sample 
of 18-25 year olds (Yim, Quas, Cahill, & Hayakawa, 2010). Using 80% power as a criterion and 
the proc glmpower procedure in SAS, the analysis indicated that 80 participants were needed. 
Thus, it appears that our sample size was appropriate for our proposed analyses. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted over two individually administered sessions, one to two weeks 
apart. Before the beginning of the first session, participants (or parents, for individuals younger 
than 18 years) completed an informed consent form, and participants were given a copy of the 
form for their records. If the participant was under the age of 18 years, verbal child assent was 
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also obtained. During Session 1, participants completed the Autobiographical Memory Task 
(AMT), which consisted of two components. Participants first responded to five memory cues 
using the traditional AMT protocol, in which all participants are asked to recall specific 
memories. The first five cues were administered to collect a baseline of individuals’ recall style. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to either the General or the Specific recall condition, in 
which they recalled fifteen memories in the assigned recall style. All of the memories that 
participants provided were audio-recorded. Participants also completed ratings of their emotional 
state before and after the AMT. Following the memory generation procedure, participants 
completed measures of executive function and emotion regulation.  
 During Session 2, conducted one- to -two weeks after Session 1 (M= 9.56 days, range 7 
– 15 days), participants listened to the audio recording of the memories that they had provided 
during the experimental portion of the AMT during Session 1. Ratings of current emotional 
states were collected before and after the memory exposure task. Session 2 ended with the 
completion of a self-report measure of rumination, depressive symptoms, and a demographic 
questionnaire. 
Measures 
Autobiographical Memory Task.  The generation of autobiographical memories was 
conducted in an interview format. First, to provide an index of participants’ pre-existing 
autobiographical memory “style”, an abbreviated version of the traditional Autobiographical 
Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was conducted. Participants were presented 
with five cues and asked to provide specific general memories in response to each of the cues. 
The cue words for this baseline test were stress, argue, punishment, conflict, and frustrate. 
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Participants were then randomly assigned to recall either fifteen specific memories (in the 
Specific condition) or fifteen general memories (in the General condition) in response to the 
following 15 negative cue words: sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, lonely, unhappy, bored, failed, 
scared, hate, depressed, upset, abandoned, disgusted, and gloomy. The cue words for both the 
baseline and the experimental portions of the AMT were based off of the cue words used in 
McNally et al., (1995). However, as McNally and colleagues used both positive and negative 
cues, and we were focused on negative memories only, the additional negative cue words were 
drawn from the Durda and Buchanan (2006) norms, matched for frequency and reading level. 
Each cue was printed on 4” x 6” index card in lower case lettering, and participants randomly 
selected the order of the cards from the deck of index cards. Individuals were given 60 seconds 
to recall a memory (either general or specific, depending on the condition) in response to each 
cue word, and the memories were audio-taped for use in Session 2.  
Specific Condition: The instructions for the Specific memory condition and baseline test 
were the same as those used in the previous literature using the AMT. Participants were provided 
with examples of specific memories. During the entire procedure, if participants did not initially 
recall an appropriate memory, they received a prompt from the researcher (e.g., “Can you tell me 
about a specific time related to [cue word]?”).  
General Condition: The instructions for the General memory condition were taken from 
the AMT-R (Dalgleish et al., 2007); participants were told that the memories they recall should 
be of a certain category of events, or a series of events, that happened to them at different times. 
Participants received examples of general memories. If participants did not initially recall an 
appropriate, general memory, they received a prompt from the researcher (e.g., “Can you tell me 
21 
about a general event related to [cue word]?”). The task instructions for the baseline and both 
conditions are included in Appendix A. 
Memory Exposure Task. The Memory Exposure Task was carried out during Session 2. 
Between the first and second sessions of the experiment, all memories were coded based on 
whether they were autobiographical in nature, their specificity, and their valence. The coding 
procedure, and reliability, is described in greater detail in the AMT Coding section, below. On 
the basis of this coding, the researchers selected 10 of the 15 provided memories for the 
participant to listen to during Session 2. The selected memories were chosen based on adherence 
to the task instructions (e.g., only general memories were selected for playback from the audio-
recordings of individuals who were assigned to the General condition). The narrowing of the 
number of memories used in Session 2 was to account for the possibility that even with prompts 
reminding participants about the instructions, not every provided memory was expected to 
adhere to the instructed recall type. In fact, in this study we found that the number of appropriate 
memories that were generated ranged from 10 to 15 memories, and did not differ by age or 
condition. When more than 10 appropriate memories were generated, the first 10 memories were 
used. Before participants listened to their audio-recordings on headphones, they received the 
following instructions: “During this time, you should think about the [specific memories/general 
categories of events] that you told us about earlier.” The experimenter then pressed play on the 
recorder. The experimenter remained in the room, and the audio-player indicated when the audio 
file had finished playing over the headphones, at which point the experimental turned off the 
audio player and participants removed the headphones.  
Emotional State Assessments. Before and after the Autobiographical Memory task in 
Session 1, and before and after the Memory Exposure task in Session 2, the Positive and 
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Negative Affect Schedule for Children (PANAS-C; Laurent et al., 1999) was administered to the 
child sample, and the parallel measure for adults, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), was administered to the college-aged sample. 
Therefore, this measure was completed four times throughout the experimental protocol. The 
PANAS has been widely established as a measure of distress and positive mood state, and it 
contains both positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) subscales. The subscales consist of 
positively valenced adjectives (e.g., excited, strong) and negatively valenced adjectives (e.g., 
sad, angry), and participants rate how applicable each adjective is to their current mood state on a 
scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Scores for each of the two subscales 
(positive affect and negative affect) were calculated separately for each of the four time points; 
an individual’s positive affect score was calculated as an average of their positive affect ratings, 
while his/her negative affect score was calculated as an average of their negative affect ratings. 
As such, scores closer to 5 on either subscale indicates a greater level of emotionality. For the 
sake of clarity, the four positive affect scores were labeled PA1 (positive affect before the 
Memory Generation Task), PA2 (positive affect after the Memory Generation task), PA3 
(positive affect before the Memory Exposure task) and PA4 (positive affect following the 
Memory Exposure task). Scores for the negative affect subscale (NA1 through NA4) were 
calculated in the same way. The PANAS and PANAS-C are included in Appendix B and 
Appendix C, respectively. 
Executive Function.  Executive function abilities were assessed using the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (WCST; Berg & Grant, 1948; Heaton, 1981). The WCST is a test of individuals’ 
ability to shift attention and update their memory, and is a commonly used measure of executive 
function in clinical, neuropsychology, and cognitive investigations (e.g., Butler, Retzlaff, & 
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Vanderploeg, 1991; Rabin, Barr, & Burton, 2005). A number of investigations have validated the 
use of the WCST with participants as young as six years old (e.g., Riccio, Hall, Morgan, Hynd, 
Gonzalez, & Marshall, 1994; Welsh, Pennington, & Grossier, 1991); however, this task does not 
always yield wide-ranging age differences. For instance, Rebok et al. (1997) found increases in 
the number of categories completed and decreases in the number of perseverative errors 
committed in children between the ages of 8 to 10, but developmental differences were not 
observed in adolescents. Similarly, other work finds that perseverative errors, in which a 
participant continues to provide a response even after receiving feedback that their response is 
incorrect, reach adult levels by about age 12 years (e.g., Chelune & Baer, 1986; Levin et al., 
1991; Welsh et al., 1991).  
To begin the task, four stimulus cards are first placed on the table (one red triangle, two 
green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles). Participants are then given 64 cards on 
which the color, shape, and number of the shapes vary (e.g., three green triangles, one red circle), 
and they are asked to sort the cards one at a time. Each time a card is sorted, the participant 
receives feedback as to whether the card was sorted correctly, and the goal of the task is for the 
participant to determine the correct sorting rule. Throughout the task, the experimenter changes 
the sorting rule once ten cards have been correctly sorted in one category, and the participant 
must then determine the new rule. The order of the required categories was consistent across all 
participants. The average number of categories that were completed was 4.31 (SD=.78), with a 
range of 2 to 5. The number of categories completed did not differ according to group, t(92) = 
.96, p = .33, or according to gender, t(92) = -1.33, p = .19. However, there was a significant 
effect of age on the number of categories completed, F(1, 92) = 8.27, p = .01, such that older 
participants completed significantly more categories than did younger participants.  
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Executive function was operationally defined as the number of perseverative errors 
committed. For example, if an individual sorted a card using the category “shape,” received 
feedback that they were incorrect in their sort, and then proceeded to sort the following card 
again according to shape, their behavior would be scored as a perseverative error. Therefore, the 
possible range of scores for perseverative errors is from 0 to 63, where higher scores indicate 
poorer executive function abilities; a score of 0 would reflect no perseverative errors and a 63 
would reflect a perseverative error on every trial. Individuals’ performance on this task was 
recorded by hand; for each card sorted, researchers documented the correct category, the 
category that the individual sorted by, and whether their sort was correct or incorrect.  
Several examinations of performance on the WCST suggest this test’s ecological validity; 
the number of perseverative errors on the WCST have been shown to predict the likelihood of 
independent living (Little, Templer, Persel, & Ashley, 1996), job status and ability to perform 
everyday tasks (Kibby, Schmitter-Edgecombe, & Long, 1998), and accuracy on a grocery 
shopping task (Rempfer, Hamera, Brown, & Cromwell, 2003). Investigations have found also 
relationships between the WCST and the Category Test, another often-used measure of 
reasoning and rule learning (Pendleton & Heaton, 1982; Perrine, 1993).  
Emotion Regulation Abilities. Emotion regulation abilities were measured with the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire in the young adult sample (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and 
the child-version of the same questionnaire for the child sample (Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents - ERQ-CA; Jaffe, Gullone, & Hughes, 2010). Both 
measures capture the emotion regulation strategies of cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression, and they use parallel questions with the ERQ-CA modified for age-appropriate 
language. Scores for reappraisal and suppression are calculated separately as summed values of 
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the raw scores, and these scores are not adjusted or standardized for age. Both the original (Gross 
& John, 2003) and child-adapted (Jaffe et al., 2010) versions of the questionnaire demonstrate 
sound psychometric properties. Gross and John (2003) report a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for 
the Reappraisal subscale of .79 and .73 for the Suppression subscale, as well as a 3-month test-
retest reliability of .69. The ERQ is located in Appendix D, and the ERQ-CA can be found in 
Appendix E.  
Depressive Symptoms. To control for any variation in participants’ depressive symptoms, 
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) was used with 
the adult sample and the equivalent Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale for 
Children (CES-DC; Weissman, Orvaschel, & Padian, 1980) was used with the child sample. 
Good validity has been observed on this scale when used with Caucasian, Hispanic, and African 
American participants (Roberts, 1992; Roberts, Vernon, & Rhoades, 1989).  Cronbach’s alphas 
in these samples range from .84 to .90, and re-test reliability has been found to range from .51 to 
.67 in two- through eight-week intervals (Radloff, 1977; Comstock & Helsing, 1976; Weissman, 
Shlomoskas, Pottenger, Prusoff, & Locke, 1977).  This measure asks participants to identify 
ways that they felt or behaved in the past week (e.g., “In the past week, I felt that everything I 
did was an effort), and asks them to indicate how often this occurred on a scale of 0 (none of the 
time (less than 1 day)) to 3 (most or all of the time (5-7 days)). The child version also asks how 
often participants have felt a particular way in the past week (e.g., “I was bothered by things that 
usually don’t bother me”) but the rating options are “not at all”, “a little”, “some”, or “a lot”.  An 
overall depression score was calculated as a continuous variable, with higher scores on the CES-
D or CES-DC indicating higher levels of depressive symptoms, and a score of 15 or above on 
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either of these measures seen as an indicator of clinically significant depressive symptoms (see 
Appendix F for the CES-D and Appendix G for the CES-DC sample measures). 
Rumination. To control for potential differences in intrusive thoughts and/or maladaptive 
emotion coping strategies, a measure of rumination was included. Rumination in the college-
aged sample was collected using the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991), a 22-item self-report questionnaire developed from the Response Style 
Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987). The RRS has been shown to have good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .82), moderate one-year test-retest reliability (.47), and 
predictive validity for depression (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolan, Roberts, 
& Gotlib, 1998). In the child sample, the Children’s Response Styles Questionnaire (CRSQ; 
Abela, Vanderbilt, & Rochon, 2004) was used. The CRSQ, the equivalent child-version of the 
RSQ, is a 25-item self-report measure that has a consistent factor structure as the RRS 
(Verstraeten, Vasey, Raes, & Bijttebier, 2010). Scores are calculated as raw totals, and are not 
age-adjusted. The CRSQ also demonstrates moderate internal consistency (Cronbach alphas 
range from .79 to .82), and this measure has been found to be predictive of depressive symptoms 
in a sample of third through sixth graders (Abela, Aydin, & Auerbach, 2007). See Appendices H 
and I for examples of the measures.  
Demographic Questionnaire. The Demographic and Background Questionnaire asked for 
the participant’s birth date, gender, and ethnic background, to serve as control variables in the 
analyses. A copy of the demographic questionnaire is included in Appendix J. 
Coding of Autobiographical Memories 
Each memory was coded on three dimensions. First, the responses were coded as either 
autobiographical memories or not. Next, each autobiographical memory was coded for 
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specificity (specific or general) and valence of the memory (negative or positive/neutral). One 
researcher coded all of the narratives, and another researcher coded 20% of the narratives (19 
transcripts) for reliability. Cohen’s Kappa scores were calculated for each of the coding 
dimensions, and reliability was very good. For the codes that assessed whether the responses 
were autobiographical memories or not, there were no deviations in the scores given by the two 
coders (ΚABmemory = 1.00). The coefficient for whether memories were specific or overgeneral 
also indicated very strong reliability (Κspecificity = 0.97), and finally, the Cohen’s Kappa for 
memory valence also indicated perfect reliability on that coding dimension (Κvalence = 1.00). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analyses 
 The means and standard deviations of the variables of interest, according to recall 
condition, are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, individuals in both groups tended to provide 
specific memories on the baseline autobiographical task, and the overwhelming majority of 
memories provided on both the baseline task and the experimental task were about negative 
experiences. In terms of ratings of positive and negative affect, it appears that levels of negative 
affect were lower, on average, than levels of positive affect. Additionally, while negative affect 
levels remained constant across the four measurement points for both conditions, positive affect 
decreased across the four assessment points, from PA1 to PA4.  
There was a large amount of variability in executive function ability, as captured by the 
number of perseverative errors committed. While the average number of perseverative errors was 
about 7 for the Specific condition and about 8 for the General condition, the number of these 
errors committed by participants in this sample ranged from 4 to 17; at the high end of this range, 
more than 25% of the responses given on the WCST were perseverative errors. In terms of 
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emotion regulation scores, individuals reported fairly high usage of reappraisal strategies in both 
conditions, and relatively lower usage of suppression techniques. Exploratory analyses reveal no 
differences according to age in reappraisal strategies, F(1, 91) = .00, p = .99, or suppression, F(1, 
91) = .00, p = .97. Participants also reported that, when they were sad, blue, or depressed, they 
ruminated on these experiences about half of the time. There were no differences in rumination 
strategies according to age, F(1, 92) = 2.01, p = .16, or gender, t(92) = .34, p = .74. 
Additionally, participants reported a wide range of depressive symptoms, and 34 
participants met the clinical cutoff (i.e., a score of 15 or higher on the CES-D or CES-DC; 
Barnes & Prosen, 1984; Mojarrad & Lennings, 2002; Weissman, Orvaschel & Padian, 1980) for 
potential depressive disorder. This number is relatively high, which may be partly due to the fact 
that participants completed the depressive symptom assessment after the Memory Exposure task, 
so they had recently listened to their negative memories. Measures of depressive symptoms, 
emotion regulation and ruminative tendencies were administered after the memory tasks and 
emotion ratings in order to avoid influencing participants’ emotional states and/or reaction to the 
memory task.  
To determine whether the individuals who met the clinical cut-off for depression 
according to the CES-D were unequally distributed between the two conditions, a chi-square test 
of independence was conducted. This analysis revealed no differences between the recall 
conditions in the number of people who met the clinical cut-off for depression (χ2(1) = 0.04, p = 
.85). There also did not appear to be systematic gender differences in depressive symptoms in 
this sample; there was no difference in the number of depressive symptoms between genders 
(t(1) = .23, p = .82), and there were no differences by gender in number of individuals who met 
the clinical cut-off for depression (χ2(1) = 0.02, p = .89). Finally, there were no differences 
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according to age in the level of depressive symptoms reported, F(1, 92) = .40, p = .53, and there 
were no differences in age according to whether individuals met the clinical cut-off for 
depression or not, t(92) = -1.17, p = .24. 
We conducted the baseline AMT assessment to capture whether participants were 
specific in their memory retrieval when the instructions were not manipulated, with the goal of 
examining whether the impact of memory retrieval condition assignment on affect was 
influenced by participants’ naturally occurring style of remembering. However, we found that 
baseline specificity did not predict positive [F(1, 89) = .34, p = .56] or negative [F(1, 89) = .22, p 
= .64] affect levels in response to the Memory Generation task, and the interaction between 
baseline specificity and condition was not significant predictor for either positive or negative 
affect. 
Preliminary analyses assessed correlations between the variables of interest in this study, 
and these correlations are presented in Table 2. In this table, age has been partialled out from all 
other correlations. This table indicates that age was related to fewer negative memories retrieved 
during the experimental portion of the AMT. Not surprisingly, emotion prior to the Memory 
Exposure task was strongly related to emotion ratings following the Memory Exposure task. 
Further, negative emotion levels were related to depressive symptoms and ruminative coping, 
and the use of reappraisal strategies was negatively related to depressive symptoms. Curiously, 
neither emotion regulation (reappraisal and suppression) nor executive function (perseverative 
errors) were related to age, even though these scores were not calculated as age-corrected scores. 




(Table 2 about here) 
 
As discussed earlier, this study was conducted over two sessions to control for the 
potential differences in cognitive effort between recalling memories in the two conditions. In 
particular, we were concerned that the greater cognitive effort related to specific memory 
generation, as compared to general memory generation, would negatively impact mood during 
the AMT task. We were interested in whether this was indeed the case. To answer this question, 
we conducted two repeated measures GLMS, one predicting PA1 and PA2 from condition, and 
the second GLM predicting NA1 and NA2 from condition. Therefore, time served as the 
repeated measure factor. This set of analyses found that there was no interaction between time 
and condition for positive affect, F(1, 89) = .26, p = .61, or negative affect, F(1, 89) = .34, p = 
.56, indicating that being asked to engage in the process of generating specific or general 
memories did not significantly impact individuals’ immediate emotional states.  
Inferential Analyses 
The inferential analyses were carried out in two stages. The first set of inferential 
analyses addressed Hypotheses 1 and 2: Does memory specificity influence affect, and how is 
this relationship impacted by age? In this analysis, we examined whether memory recall 
condition and/or age predicted positive and negative affect scores, controlling for gender, 
depressive symptoms, and rumination. The second set of inferential analyses addressed 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 by examining whether the addition of emotion regulation and executive 
function abilities helped to explain the relationship between memory specificity, age, and affect. 
Specifically, the second set of analyses looked at 1) whether executive function abilities (i.e., 
perseverative errors) and frequency of coping strategies (i.e., reappraisal and suppression) 
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contribute to individual differences in the effects of memory specificity on mood, controlling for 
depressive and ruminative symptoms, and 2) whether executive function and coping contribute 
to age differences in the effects of the two AMT conditions on emotional state.  To this end, we 
ran a series of repeated measures general linear models (GLMs), with time (before memory 
exposure, after memory exposure) as the repeated measure.  
AMT Condition and Age Effects on Affect. We first ran a pair of repeated measures 
GLMs, one predicting positive affect changes from PA3 to PA4, and the second GLM predicting 
negative affect changes from NA3 to NA4. The predictors were condition (specific versus 
general) and a continuous measure of age (in years). These models also controlled for gender and 
the continuous measures of depressive symptoms and rumination. Both models initially included 
two-way interactions between age, condition, and the other predictors, but interactions that were 
not significant were removed from the final models. The left half of Table 3 presents the 
standardized parameter estimates for each model. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The repeated measures analysis predicting positive affect across time from recall 
condition and age revealed a significant interaction between condition and time, F(1, 87) = 4.28, 
p = .04. Simple effects tests to explore the nature of this interaction indicated that individuals in 
the specific condition experienced a marginally significant decrease in positive affect following 
the Memory Exposure, F(1, 43) = 2.93, p = .09, while there was no effect of general recall on 
positive affect, F(1, 40) = .85, p = .36. This pattern is captured in Figure 1. There was also a 
marginal interaction between ruminative symptoms and time, F(1, 87) = 3.33, p = .07; however, 
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while the univariate tests revealed that ruminative strategies were more strongly related to 
positive affect at PA3 (ß = .15, p = .20) than at PA4 (ß = .04, p = .70), neither of these univariate 
tests reached or approached significance. Finally, there was no effect of gender or depressive 
symptoms on positive affect across time.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The repeated measures GLM of negative affect revealed no significant effects of 
condition, age, gender, or ruminative strategies on negative affect across time, but there was a 
significant main effect of depressive symptoms, F(1, 87) = 9.76, p = .002; individuals with 
higher depressive symptoms reported more negative affect both before and after the Memory 
Exposure task.  
AMT Condition, Age, Emotion Regulation and Executive Function Predicting Affect. In 
the second set of analyses, to examine the contributions of executive function and emotion 
regulation over and above the effect of AMT condition and age, we added the number of 
perseverative errors that participants committed during the WCST, as well as the continuous 
measures of reappraisal and suppression, as additional predictors in the models. Depressive 
symptoms and a continuous measure of rumination were again included as control variables, but 
gender was removed from these models due to the number of predictors, and the fact that it was 
not a related predictor to any of our variables of interest in the first set of analyses. As in the first 
stage of inferential analyses, two pairs of GLMs were tested, one predicting change in positive 
affect over time (PA3 and PA4) and the other predicting negative affect across time (NA3 and 
NA4). The results of these models are show in the right half of Table 3.  
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When executive function and emotion regulation scores are added to the model predicting 
positive affect, we find a marginal main effect of suppression, F(1, 84) = 3.07, p = .08, where 
higher suppressive symptoms were related to less positive affect across time. Counter to our 
predictions, we did not find any significant effects of reappraisal or executive function in relation 
to positive affect. Additionally, we again find a significant condition x time interaction, F(1, 84) 
= 5.63, p = .02. Simple effects tests reveal no effect of the General recall condition on affect over 
time, Wilk’s Lambda = .94, F(1, 37) = 2.26, p = .14, while there was a marginal effect of the 
Specific recall condition, Wilk’s Lambda = .93, F(1, 41) = 2.85, p = .10, indicating that specific 
recall was associated with a decrease in positive affect across time (see Figure 2). An analysis of 
the least squares means also revealed that individuals in the General condition had marginally 
lower positive affect before the Memory Exposure Task than did the Specific condition (p = .10), 
but there were no differences in positive affect between conditions following the Memory 
Exposure (p = .65). 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
The analysis predicting positive affect also revealed a marginal main effect of age, F(1, 
84) = 3.36, p = .07, such that older participants reported less positive affect both before and after 
the Memory Exposure task than did younger participants. Finally, there was a marginally 
significant main effect of depressive symptoms, F(1, 84) = 3.29, p = .07, where higher 
depressive symptoms were related to less positive affect across time. Rumination was not a 
significant predictor of positive affect in this analysis.  
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In the analysis predicting negative affect across time, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between suppression, condition, and time, F(1, 82) = 7.51, p = 0.01. Simple effects 
tests probing this interaction found that for individuals in the General condition, there was a 
marginal interaction between time and suppression, F(1, 36) = 3.12, p = .09, such that 
suppression was positively related to NA3 (B = .12) but was negatively related to NA4 (B = -.12) 
in the General condition. Conversely, there was a significant interaction between time and 
suppression in the Specific condition, F(1, 40) = 4.16, p = .04, such that suppression was related 
to lower negative affect at NA3 (ß = -.07), but greater negative affect at NA4 (ß = .11). For a 
representation of this three-way interaction, see Figure 3.  
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
This model also revealed a significant three-way interaction between executive function, 
age, and time, F(1, 82) = 5.27, p = .03. To examine the nature of this across time interaction, we 
plotted the relationship between executive function levels (at -1 SD, 0 SD, and +1 SD from the 
standardized executive function scores) by three age levels (at -1 SD, 0 SD, and +1 SD from the 
mean standardized age) across time (NA3 and NA4). The exploration of this interaction revealed 
that for younger participants, high executive function was related to decreased negative affect 
across time, while low executive function abilities was related to increased negative affect across 
time (see Figure 4). At the mean age, increased executive function was associated with higher 
negative affect at both time points (see Figure 5). Finally, for the older participants, low 
executive function was related to decreased negative affect from before and after the Memory 
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Exposure task, while high executive function was related to a slight increase in negative affect 
over time (see Figure 6). 
 
(Figures 4, 5, and 6 about here) 
 
Additionally, the model predicting negative affect indicated that there was a significant 
main effect of reappraisal, F(1, 82) = 8.98, p = .004; individuals who reported engaging in 
greater amounts of reappraisal reported more negative affect across time. Finally, there was a 
significant main effect of depressive symptoms, F(1, 82) = 13.50, p = .0004, where higher 
depressive symptoms were related to greater negative affect at both time points. There were no 
effects of rumination.  
As it was surprising that higher levels of executive function in older children were 
associated with elevated levels of negative affect, we wanted to examine whether this was 
attributable to the nature of the memories provided by older and younger participants. Perhaps 
the memories of older participants were more likely to be of negative experiences than the 
provided memories by younger participants? To test this, we added the percentage of negative 
memories generated on the experimental portion of the AMT to the model. However, memory 
valence was not a significant predictor of affect, and the relationships between the variables of 
interest were not substantially altered by its inclusion. 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, our results provide some preliminary evidence that memory recall style impacts 
one’s immediate emotional state, which is consistent with the argument put forth by the Affect 
Regulation Hypothesis. Indeed, individuals who were assigned to recall specific events 
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experienced decreased positive affect across time even when executive function and emotion 
regulation strategies were included in the model. Along with providing experimental support for 
the claim that overgeneral recall is more protective of emotional state than specific recall, this 
finding also connects to work that finds links between one’s attributions and assessments of 
personal experiences to the development and maintenance of depression (e.g., Beck, 1976, 
Craighead, Sheets, Craighead, & Madsen, 2011; Segal & Swallow, 1994). In this way, our work 
provides additional evidence that the manner in which we view our experiences contributes to 
our emotional wellbeing.  
It was expected that younger participants might be negatively impacted by specific recall 
to a greater extent than their older counterparts due to children’s less developed emotion 
regulation and executive function abilities. Although we did not find age differences in the 
impact of recall condition on affect, we did find that across conditions, younger participants 
reaped emotional benefits from higher levels of executive function abilities, relative to younger 
participants with lower levels of executive function skills. This finding suggests that executive 
function, and in particular inhibition skills, may be particularly helpful for younger children 
when they are talking about negative past experiences. That being said, we were surprised that 
older participants with higher levels of executive function skills did not also reap emotional 
benefits, and there are several reasons why this may have occurred.  
First, it is possible that the observed relationship between executive function and age is 
attributable to differences in the nature of the memories provided. It is possible that the intensity 
of the reported events by older participants was greater than the intensity of events reported by 
younger participants. If older participants did provide more negatively intense memories than 
younger participants, then older adults’ memories may have generated higher levels of negative 
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affect with which they attempted to cope, thus drawing more heavily on their executive function 
and emotion regulation abilities. Further, it is also possible that the types of events that were 
reported may also have differed across participants. If older participants generated more highly 
aversive or traumatic memories than did the younger participants, then older participants would 
be placing more demands on their emotion regulation and executive function abilities than the 
younger participants, resulting in an overall higher level of negative affect with age. As one 
possible way to address this question in the future, analyses could examine the emotional content 
of the specific and general memories that were provided, according to individuals’ age and 
executive function abilities.  
Another possible reason for the increased negative affect following the Memory 
Exposure task in the older participants with high executive function abilities may be that older 
individuals with greater cognitive or regulatory skills may be more willing to allow themselves 
to experience aversive emotions, because they are more confident in their ability to adaptively 
cope over time with the emotions that are brought to the surface. Conversely, younger 
participants may be less willing to generate highly aversive emotions, as they are less willing or 
able to effectively cope with them. As this study examined immediate emotional reactions, it is 
possible that a longitudinal analysis would reveal that the older participants would demonstrate 
improved emotional responses, relative to children, over time. Indeed, the expressive writing 
literature reveals that in adults, individuals who disclose negative experiences report short-term 
negative reactions but long-term emotional, psychological, and physiological benefits (e.g., 
Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003; Pennebaker, 1997). On a related note, some trauma 
victims who participate in trauma-focused research report immediate negative emotional 
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reactions to their participation, but these same individuals report long-term benefits from talking 
about their specific traumatic experiences (see Legerski & Bunnell, 2010 for a recent review). 
It is also possible that the counterintuitive findings related to age, executive function, and 
emotional responses are attributable to the differential nature of recruitment for the participants 
in the college sample and the younger sample. As the college sample was recruited from an 
Introductory Psychology research pool in exchange for class credit, while the child sample 
individually volunteered to participate in the study and were paid $20 across the two sessions, 
there may have been differences in motivation between the younger and older participants. In 
fact, age was negatively related to positive affect across conditions and time. While there are a 
number of factors that might have contributed to these differences, it is possible that the college-
aged participants were less motivated and therefore felt less positive about their research 
participation. Conversely, the younger participants may have viewed the experiment very 
positively, given the monetary compensation and the purely voluntary nature of their 
participation, which may have elevated younger children’s emotional states across conditions, 
therefore dampening any condition effects in the younger group.   
Finally, the unexpected findings related to executive function, age, and emotion may be 
attributable to the executive function task that was employed. As the literature suggests that 
executive function differences on the WCST are often observed as differences in reaction time 
(Best & Miller, 2010), and our administration of the WCST was done by hand, we did not 
capture reaction time data. Thus, the lack of age-related differences in executive function in our 
sample may be due to the manner in which we assessed executive function abilities, rather than 
evidence of no difference in executive functions according to age. 
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In addition to age and condition effects, we were also interested in whether the manner in 
which individuals cope with emotional experiences would influence the impact of memory 
specificity on affect. We did find that both suppression and reappraisal were related to emotional 
responses. In terms of suppression, we found that in the Specific condition, suppression was 
related to increased negative affect over time, while the suppression tended to be related to 
decreased negative affect over time in the General condition. This pattern of results suggests that 
people who typically avoid emotional reactions have more negative responses in the Specific 
condition than less avoidant people, probably due to the fact that avoidance could not be 
effectively employed in the listening to one’s specific memories. Interestingly, suppression was 
not related to baseline specificity, which may indicate that participants in our sample who 
reported higher levels of suppression had not developed an overgeneral recall style in response. 
Or, the lack of relationship between baseline specificity and suppression may be attributable to 
our measure of baseline specificity, which we address in more detail below. 
We also found that the effect of condition according to time, both when emotion 
regulation and executive function abilities were in the model and when they were not, appears to 
be driven more by differences in the levels of positive affect before the Memory Exposure task 
(PA3) between the groups than by the resulting affect levels after the Memory Exposure task 
(PA4). While the average PA3 levels were not significantly different according to condition in 
either model, we should be careful in our interpretation of these effects; although the directional 
impact of specific and general recall on positive affect differed, the resulting affect levels did 
not. 
 A final result that was surprising was the positive relationship between reappraisal and 
negative affect across time and condition, as it was expected that individuals who were more 
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likely to reappraise or reframe their experiences would be better able to down-regulate their 
negative affect. However, it is possible that individuals who report using more emotion 
regulation strategies, such as reappraising and suppression, may also have more concurrent 
negative emotional experiences with which they need to cope. As such, individuals may report 
engaging in more reappraisal because they have more daily experiences that require it, which 
may be why individuals who reported higher use of reappraisal strategies also reported greater 
negative affect (at both NA3 and NA4), regardless of condition. However, another possible 
reason for the link between reappraisal and increased negative affect comes from an examination 
of the metric used to capture reappraisal strategies. The ERQ and ERQ-CA’s reappraisal 
questionnaire asks participants to rate, on a scale of 1-7, the personal applicability of statements 
such as: “When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation.” While this type of question certainly asks about whether participants have thought 
about an event in a new way, this question does not require that the change in thinking is 
inherently positive. Therefore, while we would expect that thinking about an event in a new light 
would perhaps prompt some reflection and coping by the individual, it is also possible that 
individuals might be negatively reappraising their experiences. Thus, it would be helpful to 
examine differences in positive and negative reappraisal separately.  
Finally, the emotion regulation questionnaire asks participants about how they respond to 
emotional events after they have occurred, not during. As the literature suggests that reappraisal 
results in modifying memory content, typically in a more positive light, any memories to which 
reappraisal has been applied may not have been elicited by our request for negative memories. 
As such, the memories that were generated are likely to be those that have not been positively 
reappraised, and they may be of events that are more negative, more intense, and harder to 
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reappraise than other types of experiences. More detailed content analyses of participants’ 
memories may shed additional light on this possibility.  
While our study suggests that overgeneral memory may provide an immediate emotional 
benefit, it is important to note that there is evidence that overgeneral memory recall is 
prospectively predictive of the development of depression (Raes, et al., 2006; van Minnen, 
Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005), and is related to longer-lasting depressive episodes 
(Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-
Vermeeren, 2002). Overgeneral memory may have long-term negative implications for 
wellbeing because the avoidance of specific past experiences in memory may limit one’s ability 
to draw on those specific events to inform future problem-solving (Evans, Williams, O'Loughlin, 
& Howells, 1992; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams et al., 2006). In fact, this mechanism is 
thought to be responsible for the well-established finding that overgeneral memory is more likely 
in depressed patients than non-depressed controls (e.g., Valentino, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2009; 
Dalgleish et al., 2007). Given these extended negative consequences, investigations that examine 
the time course of when this short-term coping strategy shifts from an emotionally beneficial to a 
maladaptive emotion regulation approach for the individual are needed.   
Although our study is the first to date to examine the impact of experimentally 
manipulated recall style on affect, our general pattern of findings revealed a number of 
marginally significant effects. It is possible that our 80% power analysis was not conservative 
enough. Additionally, we drew our estimates of affect level changes on the PANAS and 
PANAS-C from studies that included a sample of 9-12 year olds and 18-25 year olds, and it is 
possible that the inclusion of adolescent participants in our sample (age 13-17 years) made this 
power estimate not fully appropriate for our analyses.  
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Williams and colleagues suggest that individuals with highly aversive negative 
experiences are particularly at risk for developing an overgeneral memory style, as an avoidant 
coping mechanism. Our work suggests that younger individuals with less developed executive 
function abilities, and individuals with higher suppressive tendencies, respond more negatively 
to the recall of specific negative past experiences, which may put these individuals at higher risk 
of adopting an overgeneral recall style over time, as they may be less able or willing to cope with 
the negative feelings elicited by negative memories.  
Although our examination of baseline specificity levels did not explain the observed 
relationships related to condition, age and affect, we also did not see much overall variability in 
baseline specificity. It is possible that because we used a non-traumatized sample, individuals 
may not have had highly aversive experiences that might have prompted the development of 
overgenerality. Secondly, our baseline specificity measure may not have been strong enough to 
assess differences: As this measurement was based on only five memories, the inclusion of a 
larger sample of memories at baseline would have presumably increased variation. Additionally, 
as there is some evidence that the likelihood of overgeneral recall increases across the length of 
the task (e.g., Roberts & Carlos, 2006), five memories may not have been sufficient to prompt 
individuals to shift into their general recall style, if they were likely to do so.  
This study suggests a short-term emotional benefit of avoidance through general recall. 
However, given the long-term negative implications of such an approach to recall, an assessment 
of overgeneral memory might be one quick and inexpensive way to target individuals with 
trauma histories who may need additional assistance in coping with the emotions associated with 
their past over time. Our results may also inform the manner in which we talk with child and 
adolescent trauma victims about their negative experiences. As many counseling and 
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intervention approaches, such as critical debriefing, involve encouraging the individual to talk 
about the specific events, we should be particularly sensitive to the short-term negative 
emotional impact that this approach can have on the individual at the time, in order to encourage 
individuals to reflect on the elicited emotions and reap the long-term benefits of discussing 
negative emotional events. Taken as a whole, this study provides the first experimental evidence 
for the role of memory specificity in regulating affect. We found that individual differences in 
age, emotion regulation strategies, and executive function abilities impact the emotional 
experience of talking about aversive experiences. Consistent with the perspective that the way in 
which we remember our past has implications for our current and future emotional wellbeing, 
our research provides additional insight into the development of autobiographical memory styles 
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables of Interest According to Condition   
        Specific Condition              General Condition 
Variable         M   SD     M               SD  
Age (in years)     16.71             4.31             15.62             3.85 
Baseline Memory Task: 
% Specificity   77.07          19.68             81.51           19.29 
% Negative Memories 95.65          10.25             93.26           14.26 
Experimental Memory Task:  
% Negative Memories 95.54         16.59             90.38           19.30 
# Autobiographical Mems 14.35  .90             14.39   .92 
Average Positive Affect: 
PA1     3.08  .80             3.02   .73 
 PA2     2.82  .76             2.71   .79 
 PA3     2.86  .87             2.68   .89 
 PA4     2.54  .84             2.57   .96 
Average Negative Affect: 
NA1     1.26  .34             1.30   .26 
 NA2     1.45  .49             1.45   .48 
 NA3     1.26  .43             1.30   .37 
 NA4     1.30  .41             1.37   .39 
# Perseverative Errors    8.04           3.88             7.09  2.82 
Reappraisal (max. score = 42)           29.69           6.26           30.57  5.22 
Suppression (max. score = 28)          14.02           3.33           12.98  5.42 
% Time Spent Ruminating            50.65         12.98           52.42           12.68 
  
Depressive Symptoms             13.67           7.42           14.51             9.62 
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Table 3. Standardized Parameter Estimates for Models Predicting Positive and Negative Affect 
    
                Condition and Age       Addition of ER and EF  
Variable              Pos. Affect ß   Neg. Affect ß Pos.Affect ß Neg. Affect ß  
    
Condition (ßOG)         -.06  .14   -.22  .06 
Condition x Time           
 Before          -.17  ---   -.34b  --- 
 After           .04  ---   -.09  --- 
Age          -.16  .01   -.19a  .09 
Gender (ßmale)           .34  .09    ---   --- 
Depressive Symptoms       -.17  .31**   -.21a  .38*** 
Rumination          .10   .12   .14  .12 
Rumination x Time 
 Before          .15   ---    ---   --- 
 After              .05   ---    ---   --- 
Perseverative Errors          ---   ---             -.09            -.06 
Perseverative Errors x Age         ---               ---   ---            -.04 
Before           ---               ---   ---  .05  
After           ---               ---   ---            -.12 
Reappraisal           ---               ---   .04  .28** 
Suppression           ---    ---            -.18a  .01 
Suppression x Condition         ---    ---   ---  .04 
 Before                                 ---    ---   ---  .27 
 After                                 ---               ---   ---            -.20 
____________________________________________________________________________ 














Figure 2.  Interaction between Condition and Time Predicting Positive Affect when Emotion 





Figure 3: Interaction between Suppression and Condition Across Time. Blue lines indicate 
participants’ negative affect in the General condition, and the Red lines indicate participants’ 








Figure 4. The Relationship between Executive Function (EF) levels and Time in Younger 
Participants (-1 SD from average age). Low, average, and high levels of executive function skills 
are depicted across time.  
Before                              After 




Figure 5. The Relationship between Executive Function (EF) levels and Time at the Average 
Age of Participant (0 SD from average age). Low, average, and high levels of executive function 








Figure 6. The Relationship between Executive Function (EF) levels and Time in Older 
Participants (+1 SD from average age). Low, average, and high levels of executive function skills 
are depicted across time.  
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Before                              After 
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Appendix A: Autobiographical Memory Task 
 
Instructions for the Baseline Cue Words: 
“This is an autobiographical memory experiment, and the procedure is very straightforward, and 
goes as follows. For the first part of this task, I’ll be showing you a series of 5 words.  Each 
word is printed on a separate card. Each word is the name of a trait or personal characteristic.  
Most of us exhibit or display each of these traits at one time or another.  When I show you each 
trait word, what I’d like you to do is to think of a time when you exhibited or displayed the trait 
in question.  The memory you retrieve should be very specific. That is, it should refer to a 
particular occurrence when you displayed the trait.  So, for example, if the trait word were 
excitable, you might say “I was really excited last Sunday when I was watching the football 
game on TV.” That would be a specific personal memory because it referred to a particular 
event on a particular day when you displayed the trait. If you had said, “I always get excited 
when I watch football on TV” you would not have stated a specific personal memory because the 
memory did not refer to any specific event but rather to “watching football games in general”.   
 
So, for each word, we want you to think of a specific personal memory – a time when you 
displayed the trait in question.  Although we want you to answer as quickly as you can, the most 
important thing is to answer with a specific memory, not a general memory.  As soon as you 
think of a specific instance, I want you to describe it out loud, briefly.  I’ll be timing how quickly 
you can recall a specific memory with this stopwatch. I’ll be giving you up to 60 seconds for 
each word. I’ll also record your responses on this tape recorder. Be sure you say the word out 
loud before providing your memory. Any questions?”  
 
If the participant does not provide a specific memory, researchers may prompt the participant up 
to two times with the phrase: “Can you tell me a specific personal memory about [cue word]?” 
 




Instructions for the Specific Recall Condition: 
You will now be shown another 10 cue words. For this part of the task, the memory you retrieve 
should also be very specific. That is, it should refer to a particular occurrence when you 
displayed the trait.  So, for example, if the trait word were impatient, you might say: “I was 
really impatient yesterday when I was waiting for dinner to be ready.” That would be a specific 
personal memory because it referred to a particular event on a particular day when you 
displayed the trait.  If you had said, “I’m am always impatient when I am waiting for dinnertime 
to arrive” you would not have stated a specific personal memory because the memory did not 
refer to any specific event but rather to “dinnertime in general”.   
 
So, for each word, we want you to think of a specific personal memory – a time when you 
displayed the trait in question.  Although we want you to answer as quickly as you can, the most 
important thing is to answer with a specific memory, not a general memory.  As soon as you 
think of a specific instance, I want you to describe it out loud, briefly. Be sure you say the word 
out loud before providing your memory. Any questions?” 
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If the participant does not provide a specific memory, researchers may prompt the participant up 
to two times with the phrase: “Can you tell me a specific personal memory about [cue word]?” 
 
Cue words for the specific recall condition: sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, lonely, unhappy, bored, 
failed, scared, hate, depressed, upset, abandoned, disgusted, and gloomy 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Instructions for the Overgeneral Recall Condition: 
You will now be shown another 10 cue words. For this part of the task, the memory you retrieve 
should be of a certain category of event; in other words, a series of similar events that happened 
to you at different times. So, if I said that word “impatient,” it would not be okay to say “I was 
really impatient yesterday when I was waiting for dinner to be ready,” because that does not 
refer to a category of events. But it would be okay to way “I’m am always impatient when I am 
waiting for dinnertime to arrive” because that refers to a category of events – dinnertime in 
general. 
 
So, for each word, we want you to think of a category of personal events – a series of times when 
you displayed the trait in question.  Although we want you to answer as quickly as you can, the 
most important thing is to answer with a category of events, not a one-time event. As soon as you 
think of a series of instances, I want you to describe it out loud, briefly.  I’ll be timing how 
quickly you can recall a category of events with this stopwatch. Be sure you say the word out 
loud before providing your memory. Any questions?” 
 
If the participant does not provide a general memory, researchers may prompt the participant up 
to two times with the phrase: “Can you tell me a category of personal memories about [cue 
word]?” 
 
Cue words for the specific recall condition: sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, lonely, unhappy, bored, 





Appendix B: Adult Distress Assessment – PANAS 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to each word. Indicate to what 
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to 












Quite a bit 
 
Extremely 
Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
Active 1 2 3 4 5 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C: Child Distress Assessment - PANAS-C 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then circle the appropriate answer next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel 












Quite a bit 
 
Extremely 
Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
Sad  1 2 3 4 5 
Frightened 1 2 3 4 5 
Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
Happy 1 2 3 4 5 
Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
Energetic 1 2 3 4 5 
Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
Calm 1 2 3 4 5 
Miserable 1 2 3 4 5 
Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
Cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 
Active 1 2 3 4 5 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
Joyful 1 2 3 4 5 
Lonely 1 2 3 4 5 
Mad 1 2 3 4 5 
Fearless 1 2 3 4 5 
Disgusted 1 2 3 4 5 
Delighted 1 2 3 4 5 
Blue 1 2 3 4 5 
Daring 1 2 3 4 5 
Gloomy 1 2 3 4 5 
Lively 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix D: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
 
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you 
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct 
aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel inside. The 
other is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, 
or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, they 
differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale: 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
strongly                    neutral            strongly 
disagree                    agree 
 
1.  _____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what  
                I’m thinking about. 
 
2.  _____ I keep my emotions to myself. 
 
3.  _____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what  
                 I’m thinking about. 
 
4.  _____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
 
5.  _____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that  
                 helps me stay calm. 
 
6.  _____ I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
 
7.  _____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the  
                 situation. 
 
8.  _____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in. 
 
9.  _____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
 
10. _____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the  
                  situation. 
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Appendix E: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (ERQ-CA) 
We would like to ask you some questions about your thoughts and feelings, in particular, how 
you control your feelings. The questions below involve two types of emotions. One is your 
emotional experience, or what you feel inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how 
you show your emotions in the way you talk or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, please 
answer using the following scale: 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
strongly                    neutral            strongly 
disagree                    agree 
 
1.  _____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy), I change what I’m thinking  
                about. 
 
2.  _____ I keep my emotions to myself. 
 
3.  _____ I control my negative feelings about things by changing what I’m thinking about. 
 
4.  _____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to show them. 
 
5.  _____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that  
                 helps me stay calm. 
 
6.  _____ I control my emotions by not showing them. 
 
7.  _____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the  
                 situation. 
 
8.  _____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in. 
 
9.  _____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to show them. 
 
10. _____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the  
                  situation. 
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Appendix F: CES-D 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved.  Please tell me how often you have 
felt this way during the past week.  
   
    Rarely or none           Some or a        Occasionally         Most or all of 
   of the time    little of the       or a moderate      the time (5‐7 
   less than 1 day)  time (1-2 days)    amount of time     days) 
                  (3‐4 days) 
        ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I was bothered by things that                                                 
usually don’t bother me. 
2. I did not feel like eating; my                                                   
appetite was poor. 
3. I felt that I could not shake off                                                 
the blues even with help from 
my family or friends. 
4. I felt I was just as good as other people.                                             
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on                                               
what I was doing.       
6. I felt depressed.                                                   
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort.                                             
8. I felt hopeful about the future.                                                 
9. I thought my life had been a failure.                                               
10. I felt fearful.                                                    
11. My sleep was restless.                                                 
12. I was happy.                                                    
13. I talked less than usual.                                                 
14. I felt lonely.                                                    
15. People were unfriendly.                                                
16. I enjoyed life.                                                  
17. I had crying spells.                                                  
18. I felt sad.                                                    
19. I felt that people dislike me.                                                




Appendix G: CES-DC 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or acted. Please check how much you have felt this way 
during the past week. 
 
During the past week:                      Not at all     A little    Some    A Lot 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.  _____     _____     _____     _____ 
2. I did not feel like eating, I wasn’t very hungry.            _____     _____     _____     _____ 
3. I wasn’t able to feel happy, even when my family or     _____     _____     _____     _____ 
friends tried to help me feel better. 
 
4. I felt like I was just as good as other kids.            _____     _____     _____     _____ 
5. I felt like I couldn’t pay attention to what I was doing.  _____     _____     _____     _____ 
 
During the past week:            Not at all     A little    Some    A Lot 
6. I felt down and unhappy.              _____     _____     _____     _____ 
7. I felt like I was too tired to do things.             _____     _____     _____     _____ 
8. I felt like something good was going to happen.            _____     _____     _____     _____ 
9. I felt like things I did before didn’t work out right.        _____     _____     _____     _____ 
10. I felt scared.                _____     _____     _____     _____ 
 
During the past week:            Not at all     A little    Some    A Lot 
11. I didn’t sleep as well as I usually sleep.             _____     _____     _____     _____ 
12. I was happy.                _____     _____     _____     _____ 
13. I was more quiet than usual.              _____     _____     _____     _____ 
14. I felt lonely, like I didn’t have any friends.            _____     _____     _____     _____ 
15. I felt like kids I know were not friendly or that they      _____     _____     _____     _____ 
didn’t want to be with me. 
 
During the past week:                        Not at all     A little    Some    A Lot 
16. I had a good time.               _____     _____     _____     _____ 
17. I felt like crying.              _____     _____     _____     _____ 
18. I felt sad.                _____     _____     _____     _____ 
19. I felt people didn’t like me.              _____     _____     _____     _____ 





Appendix H: Rumination Response Scale (RRS) 
 
People think and do many different things when they fell sad, blue, or depressed. Below is a list of 
possibilities. Please indicate if you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you feel 
down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
How often do you think or do the following when you feel down, sad, or depressed: 
      
 Not at all       A little      Some      A Lot 
1. Think about how alone you feel.             _____          _____      _____     _____ 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t                  _____          _____      _____     _____ 
snap out of this.” 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness.      _____          _____      _____     _____ 
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate.       _____          _____      _____     _____ 
5. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”                         _____          _____      _____     _____ 
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel.         _____          _____      _____     _____ 
7. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you  
are depressed.                                                            _____          _____      _____     _____ 
8. Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything  
anymore.           _____          _____      _____     _____ 
9. Think “Why can’t I get going?”       _____          _____      _____     _____ 
10. Think “Why do I always react this way?”                       _____          _____      _____     _____ 
11. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel  
this way.          _____          _____      _____     _____ 
12. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it.     _____          _____      _____     _____ 
13. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had  
gone better.          _____          _____      _____     _____ 
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep  
feeling this way.”              _____          _____      _____     _____ 
15. Think “Why do I have problems other people  
don’t have?”               _____          _____      _____     _____ 
16. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”                _____          _____      _____     _____ 
17. Think about how sad you feel.            _____          _____      _____     _____ 
18. Think about all your shortcomings, failings,  
faults, and mistakes.             _____          _____      _____     _____ 
19. Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything.    _____          _____      _____     _____ 
20. Analyze your personality to try to understand  
why you are depressed.         _____          _____      _____     _____ 
21. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings.           _____          _____      _____     _____ 
22. Think about how angry you are with yourself.       _____          _____      _____     _____ 
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Appendix I: Children’s Response Styles Questionnaire (CRSQ) 
 
People think and do many different things when they fell sad, blue, or depressed. Below is a list of 
possibilities. Please indicate if you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you feel 
down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
How often do you think or do the following when you feel down, sad, or depressed: 
      
 Not at all       A little      Some      A Lot 
1. When I am sad, I think about a recent situation  
wishing it had gone better.              _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
2. When I am sad, I go away by myself and think about 
why I feel this way.                    _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
3. When I am sad, I think: “Why can’t I handle things 
better?”          _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
4. When I am sad, I go someplace alone to think about 
my feelings.          _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
5. When I am sad, I think: “Why do I always react  
this way?         _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
6. When I am sad, I think about recent event to try to 
understand why I feel this way.                   _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
7. When I am sad, I think: “Why do I have problems  
 others don’t have?”         _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
8. When I am sad, I write down what I am thinking 
 and try to understand these thoughts.      _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
9. When I am sad, I think: “What am I doing to  
deserve this?”                     _____          _____      _____     _____ 
 
10. When I am sad, I reflect on myself and try to  




Appendix J: Demographic Questionnaire 
 
1) Ethnicity: ______________________ 
 
 
(2) Gender: Male  Female 
 
 
(3) Date of Birth: ___________________ 
 
 
(4) Age: __________________________ 
 
 
(5) What grade are you in? (e.g. 2nd grade  or sophomore year in college): 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
